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【요약문】본 논문은 독일 낭만주의 철학자 슐라이에르마허의 자아 개념이 
지닌 독특한 성격을 탐구함으로써, 어떻게 그의 사상이 칸트와 피히테의 
념론  주 주의를 극복하면서 동시에 실재 세계와 유기 인 계 속에
서 형성되어가는 ‘통합된 자아’를 설명하고 있는 지를 밝힌다. 슐라이에르
마허에게 자아란 선험  기  에서 움직이는 일방 인 사고 주체가 아니
라 항상 주체와 그에 상응하는 세계 간의 지속 인 상호 계 속에서 끊임
없는 자기 창조 인 과정을 통해 지어져가는 존재이다. 그의 철학  유산
을 재발견하려는 본 논문의 목 은 첫째, 자아의 능동성을 극 화시킴으로
써 세계와의 유기  계에서 가질 수밖에 없는 피동  향이라는 요소가 
거세된 근 의 주체 개념을 극복함과 동시에 둘째, 다양성을 극 화시킴으
로써 자아의 통합성을 해체시키는 탈근 주의의  다른 험을 비 인 
안목으로 재해석하려는 것이다. 
Ⅰ. Introduction
The issue of this paper is to discuss Schleiermacher’s distinctive 
* Hanshin Univ.
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understanding of the self, the unified self which is different from 
the one-sided grasp of idealists. To do this, first, I will point out 
Schleiermacher’s criticism of Kant and Fichte and his suggestion of 
the idea of the self as individuality. Next, I will discuss 
Schleiermacher’s philosophical presuppositions-the relationship 
between the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking; the 
idea of the unity of thinking and being in objective thinking. 
Finally, I will figure out Schleiermacher’s unified understanding of 
the self that keeps in its system dynamics toward creative unity. 
1. Schleiermacher’s Criticisms of Kant’s and Fichte’s Ideas 
of the Self
First of all, Schleiermacher receives a Kantian legacy in the 
sense that he seeks the transcendental ground of knowledge. For 
Kant, human beings are the thoroughly active place in the world 
where two incommensurable realms―the realm of what is (nature) 
and that of what ought to be (morality)-meet together. But how 
could the two realms interact? Can the one be located in an 
unbroken causal relation to the other? This question expresses a 
central problem of Kant’s philosophy. He tries to show that the two 
realms must be compatible because they are products of human 
thought. His philosophical attempt to account for the conditions of 
knowledge, therefore, leads him “to regard human beings as 
belonging to two worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, or the 
world of sense and the intelligible world.”1) And Kant postulates a 
priori knowledge in the noumenal world as a presupposed 
 1) Albert L. Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, 
Freedom, and Phantasy (Greenville: Scholars Press, 1982), 30. 
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transcendental ground of knowledge. Such an endeavor to set up a 
universal ground of knowledge is inherited in Schleiermacher.
Schleiermacher, however, rejects Kant’s noumenal world. For 
Schleiermacher, “Kant’s division of human experience into two 
worlds” is unacceptable.2) In Schleiermacher’s criticism, the central 
problem in Kant’s thoughts is that the phenomenal and the 
noumenal worlds are separate and stand parallel. Accordingly, 
Schleiermacher “attempts to account for our experience by regarding 
us as beings wholly immersed in one world, the world of time and 
space.”3) He believes that Kant overlooks the fact that human 
beings are the self who is an inextricable part of the world. He, 
therefore, seeks to correct this oversight, “believing that the failure 
to recognize, acknowledge, and understand the relationship of our 
being to our thinking result[s] in the inability to ascertain the actual 
way in which we are aware of thinking’s link to the world.”4) 
For Schleiermacher, Kant’s division of human experience into two 
different worlds inevitably entails the gap in which there is an 
absence of the necessary link between the noumenal and empirical 
self. In other words, Kant tries to make his theory of self‐
consciousness the foundation of the proof of the objective validity 
of the pure concepts of understanding, but he fails to demonstrate 
how pure self‐consciousness leads to knowledge of the self as an 
empirical being or to knowledge of the objective empirical world. 
For Schleiermacher, self‐consciousness is an “ongoing unity” in 
that all representations must conform to the conditions entailed in 
the self’s constant unity as the identical consciousness.”5) He 
 2) Ibid., 37.
 3) Ibid.
 4) Thandeka, The Embodied Self  (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 3.
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believes that Kant fails to ascertain the structure of unity in which 
antithetical perspectives unite. In fact, Kant fails to distinguish the 
self’s awareness of this unity of thinking from the self’s actual act 
of combining disparate elements of thinking. Schleiermacher seeks 
to demonstrate the nature of the act of the self in his Dialectic. 
Basically the same, yet more subtle, criticisms could be applied to 
Fichte’s delineation of the self. 
Fichte establishes the post‐Kantian task of philosophy in 
traversing of the gap between the noumenal and empirical self. 
According to Fichte, “Kant successfully analyzed the fact of 
knowledge but Kant left the ground of knowledge unexplained.”6) 
He believes that Kant does not actually lose the empirical self but 
simply could not see it because his theory is inadequate for the 
task. He, therefore, tries to explain how to see the link between the 
pure self and the empirical self and how to justify knowledge “by 
conceiving of the being of the self as its basis” with the notion of 
the “subject‐centered self.”7) The self is the one that “originally 
and unconditionally posits its own existence.”8) Here, Fichte seeks 
to establish the primacy of the subjectivity so that the condition of 
the world could be intelligible rather than remaining a mere chaos 
of causally linked events. Fichte tries to solve the Kant’s problem 
 5) Ibid., 37. 
 6) David E. Klemm, “Dispute, Dialogue, and Individuality in 
Schleiermacher’s Dialektik,”  in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Toward A 
Theory of Sociable Conduct and Essays on Its Intellectual-Cultural 
Context, ed. Ruth Drucilla Richardson (Lewiston: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1995), 82.
 7) Ibid., 83. 
 8) Anthony J. La Vopa, Fichte: The Self and the Calling of Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 187. 
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of the gap with the concept of human subjectivity, which is the 
condition of all being and the cause of all becoming. 
According to Fichte, “intellectual intuition” is the foundation of 
knowledge. He believes that “the ground of all knowing is the 
being of a subject that posits itself unconditionally as being self‐
posited.”9) Then, there seems to be a dichotomy between self‐
positing subject and self‐posited object in the self. Fichte, 
however, argues that the division of the self in subject and object 
clarifies nothing because the self of the original act‐of representing 
is neither subject nor object alone, but the union of both. This 
original act as a priori act is in an “undivided moment” of the 
self.10) Fichte postulates the a priori act as the ground of self 
consciousness and calls it “the absolute self‐activity of the self” or 
“intellectual intuition.” The intellectual intuition is the awareness of 
the precondition to consciousness. On the basis of the intellectual 
intuition, we realize that all distinctions, which are posited by 
ourselves as distinct from ourselves, are in fact self‐determinations 
of ourselves. In other words, the concept is a determination of the 
self, and the ground of all determined concepts is the intellectual 
intuition. Actually, with the idea of intellectual intuition, Fichte tries 
“to discover a single, indubitable, universal and necessary principle 
from which all philosophic truth could be deduced.”11)
Schleiermacher finds in Fichte’s ideas a contradiction and tries to 
solve the problem with the idea of the self as individuality. For 
 9) Klemm, “Dispute, Dialogue, and Individuality in Schleiermacher’s 
Dialektik,” 83.  
10) Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 51. 
11) Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, 
Freedom, and Phantasy, 57.
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Fichte, both receptivity and activity of the self are based on the 
idea of intellectual intuition alone. Simply speaking, according to 
Fichte, I know something because I do it, not because I experience 
it from others. The actual difference between the activity of 
intellect and the receptivity in experience is disregarded because of 
the postulate of the idea of intellectual intuition. So, knowing I and 
known‐not‐I are not differentiated in Fichte’s thought. This is the 
Fichte’s dilemma in Schleiermacher’s eyes: “The self is both 
presupposition and result of itself so that it lays formal 
contradiction.”12) Schleiermacher responds to this problem “by 
positing an element that is prior to the self‐positing itself.” The 
element is the lived self, which Klemm in his essay refer to 
“individuality of the self,” which is “neither a universal subjectivity 
nor a particular personality as such, but a unique mediating of the 
two.”13)
Schleiermacher seeks to construct a unified idea of the self in 
order to overcome Fichte’s one‐sided theory of the “subject‐
centered self.” Schleiermacher, on the one hand, shares with Fichte 
the Kantian‐inspired goal of a philosophically demonstrated ground 
of all knowledge situated in the unity of the self. It is the modern 
idea of the self as subjectivity: “the self itself as positing and being
‐posited.”14) Schleiermacher, on the other hand, accuses Fichte of 
not making enough of the self in that Fichte’s presupposition of 
“the subject‐centered self” leaves the gap between thinking and its 
object unresolved. Fichte’s method, according to Schleiermacher, at 
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best, determines a pure act of doing, but no being of the self. 
Fichte’s account, therefore, lacks explanation of nature, the world, 
and the physical aspect of human experience. The missing idea in 
Fichte is the characteristics of “the receptivity of the self in the act 
of connecting universal and particular elements,” namely, the idea 
that “the self does not posit itself but is posited by another.”15) 
Overemphasizing on intellection, Fichte spurns the use of exterior 
nature as a means of helping to determine human nature. He, 
therefore, could not reconcile the two philosophical systems―
idealism and realism. There is no room for Fichte’s ideas to 
determine how speculation and empiricism are united and form 
knowledge. In the Dialectic, Schleiermacher seeks to demonstrate 
the common ground of these two systems. 
In sum, Schleiermacher does not desert the modern philosophical 
conception of the subject, but he situates the actuality of the 
subject in its temporal‐spatial status, neither in a priori ground of 
the noumenal self nor in the transcendental postulate of universal 
subjectivity. In self‐consciousness, according to Schleiermacher, 
“there are only two elements: the one expresses the existence of the 
subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other.”16) There 
is no dualism of spontaneity and receptivity in Schleiermacher’s 
conception of the relationship between the self and the world. “The 
total self‐consciousness... is one of reciprocity between the subject 
and the corresponding Other.”17) This reciprocal and unified 
understanding of the self is the Schleiermacher’s unique contribution 
15) Ibid., 85.
16) Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith  (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1989), 13. 
17) Ibid., 14. 
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to overcome post‐Kantian problematic ideas of the self.18)
Ⅱ. A Discussion on Schleiermacher’s 
Philosophical Presuppositions
In this section, I will discuss some fundamental ideas that 
constitute Schleiermacher’s distinctive conception of the self. The 
accounts in this section are composed of two main issues: the 
co-determinate relationship of the organic and intellectual functions 
of thinking; the unity of thinking and being in objective thinking. 
These two components comprise the formulation of the structure of 
the unified self which Schleiermacher presupposes as the 
transcendental ground of all thinking and of all being. 
1. The Relationship between the Organic and the 
Intellectual Functions in Thinking
Schleiermacher divides the nature of an act of thinking into two 
ways in which it functions. “Every instance of thinking arises from 
two elements, a formal element and a material element.”19) The 
material element of an act of thinking is “comprised of a certain 
organic function,” while the formal element is “the reception of the 
material element in a form.”20) More specifically speaking, the 
18) Andrew Bowie, introduction to Hermeneutics and Criticism, by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), x. 
19) Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialectic (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1996), 19. 
20) Ibid. See the footnote 30 which shows Twesten’s elaboration 
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organic function is that which craves to know and thus opens sense 
organs to be able to be filled with “things that are so‐called 
matters of understanding.”21) These matters, “the thinking‐matter” 
[Denkstoff], which are exterior to our reason, characterize our mental 
life primarily to be receptive. Our thinking, according to 
Schleiermacher, is “organically affected” by the matters.22) Without 
this organic function, a pure formal thinking does not occur and 
becomes vacuous. Importantly and peculiarly, in Schleiermacher’s 
ideas, “every instance of thinking rests on an organic function.”23) 
On the other hand, the formal function, called “intellectual function 
in thinking,” determines the thinking‐matter (sensible data) so that 
something can be known. This function is the active agent which 
combines manifold data into unity. In their correlation, one function 
of an instance of thinking without the other gives not a complete 
act of thinking on the way to knowledge. In relation, “every formal 
element can embrace the entire realm of organic functions, and vice 
versa.”24)
The organic function, in the process of forming knowledge, shifts 
the activity of reason from the mere will to conceptualize to the 
actual construction of a concept. Schleiermacher says that 
“[a]bsolute knowing can become real only in its uniting with the 
organic element.”25) Through the organic function, the world 
impacts our sense organs, and the impact results in “organic 
affections,” differently called “the first affection.”26) The organic 
on the ninth lecture.
21) Ibid., 20.
22) Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 64.




affections, as the original condition of consciousness, are the 
internal expression of a particular capacity of our mental life to be 
engaged by what is external to it. On the other hand, reason as the 
receiving agent for the activity of the organic function constitutes 
the interior ground of consciousness. Now, Schleiermacher brings 
about a “co-determinate relation between reason and sensing.”27) In 
the interaction of reason and sensing, a determinate place is 
established in consciousness for external being. He refers to this 
determinate place in consciousness as concept. 
For Schleiermacher, a concept is reason’s activity of positing a 
location in consciousness for a particular group of organic 
affections. In the concept formation, reason and organic functions 
have different roles. A concept is not merely innate to reason, but 
“hovering between what is general and what is particular.”28) Here, 
the particular is that which is purely given in being but which does 
not purely resolve into thought, and the universal is what is 
completely given in thought but which cannot be purely shown in 
being. This hovering concept hence denotes the presupposed 
correlation of the determinate activity of reason with the 
indeterminate activity of organic function. For Schleiermacher, our 
knowing consists in an oscillation between the organic and the 
intellectual function, neither of which can be purely present as 
itself. 
And then, what’s the transcendental ground for making the 
oscillation possible? In Schleiermacher’s terminology, the transition 
[der übergang] allures for the unifying ground. “[I]f human thinking 
26) Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 65.
27) Ibid.
28) Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 23, 24.
The Encounter of the Self and the World 237
is an alteration between thinking and willing,” says Schleiermacher, 
then “the transition or ‘übergang’ between thinking and willing in 
the self reveals something about the being of the one thinking and 
also presents us with an analogy of the transcendent ground.”29) 
Life is a series of antithetical transition from thinking to willing 
and back again. Both thinking and willing are inextricably bound 
up with oppositions between the intellectual and the organic poles. 
Here, thinking means a description of consciousness from the 
organic perspective, while willing expresses the intellectual’s 
perspective. “Our being as the unity of thinking and willing is the 
übergang.”30) According to Schleiermacher, the transition between 
two functions is itself the limit or boundary between the having‐
ceased of one and the not‐yet‐ having‐begun of the other. The 
limit or boundary of this transition is called “null‐point” 
[Nullpunkt] or “indifference” [Indifferenz]. The null‐point at 
transition as the foundation for all consciousness is “the point of an 
immediate relation of the self to itself as the original unity of 
opposites.”31) The transition is the openness and the belonging‐
together of both functions. Now, we are ready to discuss 
Schleiermacher’s Gefühl. 
Gefühl is the transition point within and between each moment of 
experiences. Gefühl, as subjective, immediate self‐consciousness, 
refers to the identity of the self from one instance of experience to 
the next. Schleiermacher uses the term to point out the experience 
of our nature. Gefühl expresses the crucial aspect of life, “abiding‐





in‐self (Insichbleiben),” not “passing‐beyond‐self (Aussichheraustreten).”32) 
According to Schleiermacher, Gefühl can never be taken up into 
reflexive thoughts because it is in us as the identity of contrasts 
between intellectual and organic functions in thinking. Gefühl is 
merely expressed as the null‐point of thinking in objective 
consciousness; however, it is “never disappearing entirely” through 
all phases of the temporal stream.33) According to Schleiermacher, 
therefore, Gefühl overcomes the subject-object dichotomy on which 
thinking and knowing are structured. In Gefühl, the absolute unity 
of the ideal and the real, merely presupposed in thinking and 
willing, is actually accomplished. Gefühl both embraces and cancels 
the antithesis between thinking and willing.
For Schleiermacher, the self of immediate self-consciousness is 
distinct from the self of the reflected self‐consciousness. The latter 
self is the identity of the subject in different moments. Such identity 
rests upon the gathering together of various moments and then 
identifies that which they have in common. This is indirect, 
mediated consciousness. Immediate self‐consciousness, on the 
contrary, is the consciousness in transition so that it is null 
consciousness of the self. Gefühl as immediate self‐consciousness is 
not an objective fact of consciousness; rather it is that which makes 
objective facts of consciousness possible. The distinction of the 
immediate self‐consciousness from the reflected self‐consciousness 
characterizes Schleiermacher’s outstanding grasp of the self. It 
indicates a big difference of Schleiermacher from idealists. 
According to Fichte, the positing of self‐consciousness includes 
32) Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 8. 
33) Manfred Frank, “A Look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic,” trans. by 
Christine Helmer (Manuscript, 2001), 39.
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“the positing of the actual ‘difference of elements’ by the I as they 
occur in the relation of reflection.” For Schleiermacher, the positing 
of self-consciousness is “a pre-reflexive inner-awareness that is 
‘ichlos’ in the sense that it is not in the first place pronominally 
articulated.”34) In Schleiermacher’s ideas, therefore, Gefühl represents 
“a thoroughly immanent third element” in us, “which is itself 
co-posited in the play of alteration between opposites as the middle, 
in which the transformation of each happens.”35) “Gefühl... comes to 
stand ‘only in the subject’ but is ‘not effected by the subject’.”36) 
For Schleiermacher, Gefühl is that which arises at the point where 
nature and mind meet. 
Schleiermacher employs the term Anschauung to signify the 
perspective of objective consciousness with regard to the indifferent 
point between the organic and the intellectual functions, while 
Gefühl denotes the subjective perspective of this transition. Gefühl 
refers to the immediate awareness of our nature, that is, that which 
posits as distinct from what is posited. Anschauung, in contrast, 
refers to “immediate and individual representations of the world.”37) 
The two terms are identical in a sense that they both denote the 
same indifferent point between the organic and the intellectual 
functions in thinking. Their difference is in the perspective from 
which the indifferent point is expressed. Gefühl is the positive 
expression of the identity of our beings. Anschauung is the 
awareness of this point of indifference of the two functions from 
34) Manfred Frank, Das individuelle Allgemeine: Textstrukturierung und 
interpretation nach Schleiermacher  (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1977), 95, 97, quoted in Klemm’s essay, 94.
35) Ibid.
36) Ibid.
37) Frank, “A Look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic,”  36.
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the standpoint of objective consciousness. Gefühl is the awareness 
of this point of indifference by subjective consciousness. Again, we 
could discuss them in this way. There are two events: The one is 
“the shift or change in thinking from one function to the other.” 
The other is “the way in which self‐consciousness is authenticated 
or is felt as the organic agency of the world.”38) The first event is 
the state of Anschauung while the second is that of Gefühl. 
Schleiermacher’s term Anschauung shows very different aspects 
from that of idealists. As we saw the distinctiveness of Schleiermacher’s 
Gefühl in the previous paragraph, his version of Anschauung also 
has an insight to overcome the split of Fichte’s intellectual 
intuition. Fichte’s attempt, which tries to solve the problem of the 
split between receptivity (intuition) and the spontaneity of the 
intellect by the notion of the prior activity of the self, entails 
another split of the self into knowing‐I and known‐not‐I. 
Schleiermacher responds to this problem here by suggesting that “it 
is only by an acceptance of an inherent link of ourselves to a 
world which transcends both our cognitive and practical activity that 
we can really comprehend our place in the universe.”39) 
Anschauung, for Schleiermacher, is objective‐consciousness without 
an object, that is, object‐less awareness, which consists of the 
organic and the intellectual functions of thinking at their point of 
indifference. In sum, the transcendental ground of both Gefühl and 
Anschauung pertains to the nature of the relationship of the organic 
and intellectual functions to each other. 
The doctrine of individual self‐consciousness stands at the center 
of Schleiermacher’s system which is based on the principle derived 
38) Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 95.
39) Bowie, Hermeneutics and Criticism, xvi.
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from the process of life. Schleiermacher discovers that the situation 
of immediate self‐consciousness is the primordial situation for all 
human activity. This situation expresses the immediate givenness of 
something to the receptive self. In this case, the something given is 
the “inner-worldly situation” of the receptive self.40) There is real 
interaction and the inner and the outer dimension in human 
individuality. Through the interaction, the universal is acquired. 
Therefore, “the universal conditions of becoming or acting do not 
articulate an overall universality without any specific determined 
traits.”41) Human life and history really depends on “the physical 
process” and its “organic productivity.” The key idea of Schleiermacher’s 
understanding of the self is that “feeling and the immediacy of self
‐consciousness are the constitutive, primordial, and insurmountable 
situation of human existence.”42)
In sum, Schleiermacher’s examination of the role of the organic 
and the intellectual functions in thinking plays a crucial role in his 
philosophy. Especially, his Dialectic rests upon the analysis of the 
role of the two functions in thinking. These two functions express 
the spontaneity and receptivity of sense experience and reason in 
thinking. They pertain to the organic affections and the intellect 
(reason) in the process of concept formation. Both are co-determinate 
agencies which constitute objective thought. Schleiermacher argues 
that the structure of thinking is based on the way in which these 
two functions relate to and mutually interact with each other. His 
analysis of the role of the organic and the intellectual functions in 
40) Eilert Herms, “Process and God in Whitehead and Schleiermacher” 
(Manuscript, 2003), 8.
41) Ibid., 9. 
42) Ibid., 14. 
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thinking provides him with the structural elements for his argument 
for a presupposed transcendental ground of Gefühl and Anschauung. 
The relationship of the organic and the intellectual functions is a 
fundamental ground of knowledge. 
2. The Idea of the Unity of Thinking and Being in Objective 
Thinking
Schleiermacher thinks of the integrity of human experience as a 
unity of thinking and being. He says that all our activities are 
based on our unstated presupposition that thinking and being 
correspond. “In every instance of thinking,” says he, “what is 
thought is a knowing, what is known is a being.”43) Without the 
presupposition of this structure of unity of thinking and being in 
objective thinking, no knowledge is possible. Kant could not 
adequately explain this presupposition or our conviction concerning 
this theory of coherence because of the gap in his theory of the 
self. Schleiermacher tries to identify the presupposition and the 
source of human conviction. To do this, he transforms the Kantian 
gap between pure and empirical knowledge into the source of the 
conviction within human beings. The conviction is that we are the 
whole, not fractured, self, and that the world is aligned with our 
inner process of knowing. 
According to Schleiermacher, the self is the original source of 
both identity and difference. Our first certain knowledge is the 
opposition of the self and others. This is our first experience of 
difference and dissonance. Our first experience of continuity is that 
of the moments and functions of the self. The very possibility of 
43) Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 16.
The Encounter of the Self and the World 243
thinking is an account of this primal experience of identity and 
difference by the self. For Schleiermacher, therefore, the unity of 
our world is not guaranteed by the presupposition that there is one 
single mode of processing through the single mode of causality. 
Rather, he argues the given fact within our world that there are 
various modes of causality working together in continual passages. 
“What guarantees the unity of our world and the different modes of 
processing the overarching continuum within it is the openness of 
all these different modes of processing to being mutually 
conditioned by the working of all the rest.”44) Surely, there is no 
single mode of absolute processing. “No mode of process within 
this world given to and inhabited by us is the unique ground for 
the existence of other modes; no one produces and guarantees 
harmonious openness of all different modes of process.”45) 
In Dialectic, Schleiermacher says that all thinking is a 
combination of either concepts or judgments.46) Schleiermacher, by 
exploring the two forms of objective thinking (concept and 
judgment), tries to reveal the rules of procedure for each actual act 
of thinking here. Concept is the comprehensive grasp of manifold 
aspects of organic affections while judgment is the expression of 
the dominance of the intellectual function in objective thinking.47) 
Judgment brings clarification or definition to the antecedent concept. 
It untangles the chaotic manifold aspects through a series of 
propositions. Judgment begins with the determination given to the 
intellectual function by the organic affections. Judgment thereby is 
44) Herm, “Process and God in Whitehead and Schleiermacher,” 11.
45) Ibid. 
46) Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 22.
47) Ibid., 26.
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a posteriori thinking because it originally depends on the organic 
affections and presupposes something already given. Concept, on the 
contrary, is a priori because it originates with the impulse of the 
desire to know. Concept and judgment become the source of 
determinability in each other. The limit of the beginning of the 
concept, therefore, is the limit of realization of all possible 
judgments. 
For Schleiermacher, unity presupposes a constant relationship with 
diversity. Otherwise, the absolute unity of being is only an empty 
thought. It can be a full or adequate thought only if it arises from 
diversity. Where there is a unity of being, one must presuppose 
that this unity has emerged from the diversity of being. Diversity, 
on the other hand, demonstrates the connectiveness of being through 
which unity emerges. Thinking present for being is the production 
of determinate form by means of which being can be discerned. 
This thinking has two forms: concept and judgment. The unity of 
concepts presupposes a separation of being. The plurality of 
judgments presupposes a universal connection of being. In sum, at 
the real ground of thinking, there is a fundamental presupposition 
that the totality of the beginning of concept and the totality of 
things are identical. This presupposition refers to the totality of 
actual thinking. This totality is the unity of all being and all 
thinking as one. 
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Ⅲ. Schleiermacher’s Unified I: The Encounter of the 
Self and the World
Schleiermacher tries to delineate a transcendental standpoint that 
allows to see and to feel the unity of thinking and being hidden by 
the gap between the noumenal and the empirical self. The 
underlying principle of Schleiermacher’s system is derived from the 
self‐world polarity.48) The self is open to what is outside it in the 
following three ways: First, the self remains within itself and is 
receptive in relation to the world. Secondly, the self goes outside 
of itself and is active in relation to the world. Thirdly, the self 
both remains within itself and goes outside of itself in a reciprocal 
relation between passivity and activity.49) In the dynamic interaction 
between the self and the world, we see so many creative 
oscillations of dipolar elements toward unity: oscillation between the 
organic and intellectual functions towards a proper thinking, 
oscillation between self and the world in the organic function, 
oscillation between unity and diversity in the intellectual function, 
and so on. All these oscillations maintain a tension of spontaneity 
and receptivity to acquire a creative unity. 
Schleiermacher rejects dualistic ideas and presents creative ideas 
in dynamic dipolarities. Here, I use the term “dynamic” to mean on
‐going movements toward creative unity; I use “dipolarities” to go 




argues “the individuality of the self” which uniquely mediates both 
universal subjectivity and particular personality. The dipolar tensions 
between the universal and the particular and between the ideal and 
the real always exist in Schleiermacher’s idea of the self. These 
tensions undergird the vitality and balance of various dipolar pairs. 
First of all, we could see a fundamental dipolarity of the organic 
and the intellectual functions in thinking. The organic function is 
the human capacity for sensibility while the intellectual function is 
the human activity of reason. To become true knowing, the ideal 
and the real aspects of thinking come together.50) The first step 
toward knowing is “proper thinking” that takes place in the 
interaction of the two functions. The one function without the other 
cannot be yet a thinking. The creative oscillation between the 
organic and the intellectual functions guarantees proper thinking and 
thereby knowing. 
The organic and the intellectual functions themselves have each 
own dipolar system. The organic function oscillates between the self 
and the world whereas the intellectual function oscillates between 
ideal unity and real diversity. The organic function represents “the 
agreement between thinking and being” and thus involves “the 
proper relating of subject and object.”51) In the oscillation of the 
self and the world in the organic function, the self reflects the 
subject pole of human experience (internal consciousness). The 
world represents the objective pole of human experience (external 
50) Michael Nealeigh, “The Epistemology of Friedrich Schleiermacher 
from a Dipolar Perspective,” in Schleiermacher in Context, ed. Ruth 
Drucilla Richardson (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 
183.
51) Ibid., 184.
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consciousness).52) In the oscillation between ideal unity and real 
diversity in intellectual function, unity reflects the agreement 
between thought and its object; diversity represents real “matter” of 
thinking. The oscillation of these two categories―unity and diversity
―in intellectual function makes possible the activity of reason. 
Like the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking, 
concept and judgment in objective thinking are correlative and 
mutually interdependent in producing more clarified meanings. They 
also have each own dipolar system. Concept is “hovering” between 
the general and the particular, between the higher and the lower, 
and in other words between power (Kraft) and manifestation or 
phenomenon (Erscheinung).53) Judgment oscillates between subject 
and predicate to express being as dynamic. 
For Schleiermacher, all these creative oscillations of dipolar 
systems are based on two transcendental grounds―God and the 
world. Schleiermacher defines the totality of being as our idea of 
the world and the unity of being as the idea of God. God is the 
unity with the exclusion of all contrasts while the world is the 
totality with the inclusion of all contrasts. Accordingly, the terms, 
God and the world, represent the two components of 
Schleiermacher’s transcendental formula for all objective thinking. 
God, as the unity of being, is that to which concepts ultimately 
refer in thinking. The world, as the totality of being, is that to 
which all judgments ultimately refer in thinking. The unity of being 
(God) presupposes that this unity exists in relation to the diversity 
of being (the world), vice versa. The two ideas are thus correlative. 
According to Schleiermacher, all adequate formulae for the transcendental 
52) Ibid.
53) Ibid., 186, and Dialectic, 23.
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ground must entail the two ideas―God and the world. God and the 
world are not identical. Each refers to a differently conceived 
determining ground of consciousness. These two, however, cannot be 
totally separated from each other because they are only two values 
for the self‐same claim.54) 
Ⅳ. Conclusion
In a nutshell, Schleiermacher discovers a way to affirm the 
presence of the unified self, a self through the life process of 
which there are actual encounters between the self and the world. 
This unified self is wholly immersed into the world so that it 
affirms interconnection rather than separation. To construct the idea 
of the self, Schleiermacher argues the transcendental ground of 
knowing and being. He maintains thoroughgoing vitality in his 
dipolar structure, and hence he can figure out an integral self in on
‐going movements toward creative unity without falling into one‐
sided extremities. Schleiermacher’s unified self is not only to 
overcome inadequate understandings of his contemporaries but also 
to suggest a great answer to the postmodern predicament in which 
there remains exceeding deconstruction of the self. This is the great 
teaching of Schleiermacher!
54) Schleiermacher, Dialectic, ⅹⅹⅲ
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ABSTRACT
The Encounter of the Self and the World
－A Study of Schleiermacher’s Unified I－
Kim, Hi-Heon
This paper is to study Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher’s 
understanding of the self that criticizes the subjectivist bias of 
Kant’s and Fichte’s idealism and constructs a unified idea based on 
the real encounter of the self with the world. For Schleiermacher, 
the self is neither a thinking subject, which has an a priori ground 
of the noumenal self, nor a pure being, which postulates the 
universal subjectivity in thinking. Rather, it is always and 
completely moving in a self‐creative process of continual 
reciprocity between the subject and the corresponding world. To 
discover the legacy of Schleiermacher’s idea in this paper aims not 
only to overcome the modern subjectivity, which maximizes the 
spontaneity of the self in thinking and being without its receptivity 
from the world, but also to redirect the postmodern deconstruction 
of the self itself, which maximizes the diversity without the unity 
of the self. 
Keywords: Subjectivity, Gefühl, Consciousness, Subjectivist fallacy, 
Schleiermacher
